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HAD THE COURT FOLLOWED RULE 11, THERE WOULD HAVE 
BEEN NO GUILTY PLEA THEN AND THUS, THERE CAN BE 
NONE NOW 
On January 18,2006, the Court said: 
THE COURT: Okay. Count III is dealing in harmful material to a 
minor, a third-degree felony. A third-degree felony is punishable by 
incarceration in the Utah state Prison for an indedeterminate period of 
time not to exceed five years, together with a fine up to $5,000 and/or 
both. Do you understand that, sir? 
MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. It alleges that you, or or about or between June 
1, 2005 and October 1,2005 in Utah County, Utah, knowing that a person 
was a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the 
proper age of a minor, did intentionally distribute or offer to distribute, 
exhibit or offer to exhibit to a minor any material harmful to minors, or 
intentionally produce, present or direct any performance before a minor 
that was harmful to minors, or intentionally participated in any 
performance before a minor that was harmful to minors. Do you 
understand that charge, sir? 
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MR. WHITE: Yes, sir, R. 115, pp. 3-4. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Laws of Criminal Procedure requires: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court 
has found: 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
The factual basis the prosecutor stated was: 
MS. KELLY: ..Between June 1st of 2005 and October 1st of 2005 the defendant 
was engaged with - in a sexual relationship with a 14-year-old girl in Highland, 
which is in Utah County. As part of that relationship he had her take pictures of 
himself while sexually aroused, and they are pornographic - those pictures are 
pornographic in nature. 
THE COUT: Okay. 
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MS. KELLY: She not only took the pictures. She also saw thfenu viewed them. 
THE COURT Okay. 
MS. KELLY: Exhibited them to her. 
THE COURT: Is that what happened on those occasions, sirj? 
MR. WHITE: Yes, sir, R. 115, pp. 7-8. 
The record is void of any recital of a plea bargain leading to the guilty 
plea- In fact, however, there was a plea bargain. The terms were, 
according to Mr, White, that in consideration of his guilty plea as stated 
above, he would serve no time: 
2. On November 23, 2005 I appeared for the preliminary hearing in the 
subject case at the appointed time. The complainant, Chelsea Wright did 
not appear until three and one-half hours after the appointed time. My 
attorney, Anthony Rippa, did not move to dismiss the case, but waited until 
Chelsea Wright finally appeared with her mother. 
3. In the meantime, the prosecutor, Donna Kelly, offered to drop the two first 
degree felony rape charges were I to plead guilty to the two third degree 
felony charges of distributing harmful material to a minor. 
4. Mr. Rippa asked me whether I would so agree. I Said that I would so long 
as there were no jail and no registration as a sex Offender. Mr. Rippa spoke 
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to Ms. Kelly, and told me that there would be no jail. She researched the 
law and found that conviction for the two third degree felonies would not 
require sex offender registration. 
5. Given that representation, I agreed to the plea bargain. Later, after I 
substituted Thomas M. Burton for Mr. Rippa I learned that my pre-
sentencing report recommended that I serve one year in jail. I further 
learned that Ms. Kelly meant that there would be no prison time, not any 
jail time. 
6. During this time, I was trying to reach my California attorney, Thomas M. 
Burton, but he did not return my calls. I, therefore, decided to go along 
with the disposition that my attorney, Mr. Rippa, recommended. 
7. Upon entering my guilty plea, I did not distinguish between prison and jail, 
and was under the impression I would not have to spend any time locked 
up, let alone a year. I entered the plea because Mr. Rippa told me to do so, 
and that it was a good deal. I have learned that plea bargain is not the 
agreement that I thought that I was making. 
* * * 
9. Had I known that there would be a prospect of spending a year in jail 
pursuant to my guilty plea, I would not have agreed to plead guilty, R 107-
109. 
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At sentencing, Donna Kelly, the prosecutor, admitted that there was 
a plea bargain and that the State was not seeking prison time: 
THE JUDGE: Ms. Kelly? 
MS. KELLY: Your honor if I could just review what the plea 
statement in advance of plea says. 
THE JUDGE: the statement in advance of plea agreement the 
statement in advance of plea says plead guilty to both charges and refer 
matter to adult probation and parole for sentencing and recommendation. 
That's it. 
MS KELLY: I had agreed with Mr. [Rippa] his previous counsel not 
to recommend a prison term. But there was, according to my memory 
there was no agreement on jail in the county jail. I was free to recommend 
that. 
THE JUDGE: It doesn't, it doesn't say. I just says refer for Adult 
Probation and Parole recommendation. So whatever, that all that's in the 
memorandum. Whatever, I'm at your mercy as though what you agreed, I 
don't have whatever -
MS. KELLY: Okay. I'm willing to concede that we agreed not to 
recommend a prison term. R. 255, p. 6-7. (emphasis added) 
Had the Court sentenced Daniel White as recommended, he would 
have served no more, and perhaps less, than one year in jail. Daniel White 
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challenged the draconian methods of the diagnostic unit and CW's family 
wanted prison. The Court then exhibited anger at Mr. Burton for objecting 
to the diagnostic unit, and his seeking to keep the Court focused on the 
guilty plea issue, not the dismissed charges in exchange for the guilty plea. 
The Court then sentenced the defendant to 5 years in prison, R. 255, pp. 7-
12. 
Although the Court observed that the plea agreement was not recited 
on the record, and although Ms. Kelly admitted that she would not have 
requested prison time under that agreement, the Court used the absence of 
the plea agreement to sentence the defendant to prison. Mr. White plead 
guilty to a bargain of no incarceration and instead got a year in prison. 
Had the Court followed Rule 11, there would have been no guilty plea. That 
is a sufficient ground for the plea to be withdrawn and for the sentence to 
be struck from the record. 
THE FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR THE GUILTY PLEA DOES 
NOT CONSITUTE THE CRIME OF PORNOGRAPHY FOR WHICH 
THE DEFENANT COULD BE PUNISHED 
The two pictures taken by CW of defendant in his bedroom doing 
nothing but holding his penis are not pornographic as a matter of law. 
There is no evidence that the organ is turgid since most of it is hidden from 
view. It could just as well be an anatomical pose. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in City of St. George v. Turner, 860 p.2d 
929 (1993) reviewed two drawing on appeal. "The two drawings that form 
the basis for the obscenity charge are sprayed in the bottom left-hand 
corner of one of the sheets. The first drawing depicts a naked woman 
reclining with her legs spread toward the viewer. The woman's pubic area 
consists of three or four black paint spots. The second drawing appears to 
be a close-up of the female genitalia, although it may be subject to different 
interpretations. The two crudely and indistinctly drawn depictions are not 
readily apparent from among the melange of other random drawings, 
phrases, and symbols. Above the drawing of the woman are the statements 
'why not let someone else think for you?' and 'tuna factory xxx/ To the left 
of the second drawing is a very small sign stating, 'tunnel of love/ A faint 
yellow arrow points from the sign to the female genitalia. In some 
proximity to the drawings are the statements 'keep out/ 'not yours/ and 'its 
mine all mine/ 
The Court found the images not obscene: 
Clearly, Miller and its progeny allow government to regulate 
and ban the commercial exploitation of hard-core 
pornography. However, the drawings at issue here do not even 
come close to "'public portrayal of hard dore sexual conduct for 
its own sake and for the ensuing commercial gain."1 Jenkins v. 
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Georgia, 418 U.S. 153,161,94 S.Ct. 2750,41 L.Ed.2d 642 
(1974) (emphasis added) (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 34,93 
S.Ct. at 2620). First, the drawings were not rendered for the 
purpose of commercial marketing. Second, mere nudity does 
not constitute hard-core sexual conduct. Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,95 S.Ct. 2268,45 L.Ed.2d 125 
(1975); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153,161,94 S.Ct. 2750, 
2755-56,41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). 
Before "sexual conduct" can be obscene, there must be 
some degree of sexual activity. The lewd exhibition of the 
genitals in a manner that suggests some kind of sexual action 
or conduct may constitute hard-core sexual conduct, but 
simple nudity without more is not lewd conduct for the 
purpose of determining legal obscenity.(fn3) In United States 
v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499,501 (1st Cir.1974), the court held 
that pictures of naked men that revealed no bodily contact, 
exotic positions, or sexual arousal did not constitute a lewd 
exhibition of the genitals. Similarly, in Huffman v. United 
States, 470 F.2d 386,401 (D.C.Cir.1971), the court held that 
the First Amendment protects the depiction of nude women 
even "where the pictures focus upon the pubic areas and poses 
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are struck in such a way as to emphasize the female genitalia." 
See also Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353,1365 
(5th Cir.1980). 
In Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 448 F.Supp. 306,396—97 
(N.D.Ohio 1977), the court observed: [T]he line drawn 
between hard core pornography which is subject to restriction, 
and the depictions and descriptions of sexual conduct which 
may not be restricted, depends on the amount of physical 
activity which is connected with the sexual depiction or 
description. If the human subject of the depiction or 
description is engaged in sexual action, whether by himself or 
herself, or with another, then the material is "hard core" 
sexual conduct, as the Supreme Court used the term, and it 
may be banned. When, however, the description or depiction 
is of sexual conduct without a significant action element, i.e., 
the sexual conduct is passive in nature, then the description or 
depiction is not "hard core" and it may not be banned or 
restricted. (Emphasis in original.) A similar observation was 
made in People v. Ventrice, 96 Misc.2d 282,408 N.Y.S.2d 
990,992~93 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1978): Since lewdness cannot be 
presumed from the mere fact of nudity, there must be a 
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showing of lewd conduct from which the intention to act in a 
lewd manner can be drawn..-Where genitalia have been 
graphically portrayed, together with some indication of sexual 
activity, e.g., sexual intercourse, masturbation or sodomy, 
absent social justification or excuse, the material in question 
has been held obscene. However, the graphic representation of 
genitalia, without more, is not a violation of the obscenity 
statute.... It is [the] graphic depiction or simulation of sexual 
conduct that establishes the line beyond which lies obscenity, 
at pp. 925-936. 
There is, in the two photographs in this case, in which the defendant 
is wholly passive, nothing that supports a two felony convictions and a year 
in prison. More supported by the facts would have been a guilty plea to 
Class B misdemeanor lewdness under §76-9-702(1), or a Class A 
misdemeanor sexual battery under §76-9-702(3). Felony pornography, it 
is not. 
THE STATE HAS UNCONSITUTIONALLY PUNISHED THE 
DEFENDANT NOT FOR THE PORNOGRAPHY COUNT HE 
PLEAD GUILTY TO BUT FOR THE RAPE COUNTS THAT WERE 
DISMISSED 
The state had no discretion whatsoever to punish Defendant as a 
sexual predator and treat him as a danger to society. But for the 
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unjustified, unsupported, and biased report of Dr. Fox, was no legitimate 
proof of that in the record. Defendant was not advised that by pleading 
guilty to the pornography count he would be evaluated with the ridiculous 
and unconstitutionally invasive plethysmograph, as if he plead guilty to the 
rape charges or had molested a small, innocent child. Nor was he ever 
advised that he would be placed in the so-called "diagnostic unit" that is 
even more medieval than the plethysmograph. The ninety-day term 
obviously was aimed more at punishment on the pretext of someone's 
demented view of recidivism than at diagnosis, which is a one-day 
procedure when properly conducted. 
The State claims that the defendant's objection to the unit was not 
preserved. That is because neither the defendant nor his counsel could not 
have imagined what it involved. As soon as its misnomer was apparent, 
Defendant strongly objected and was just as strongly rebuked by the Court, 
R. 209,212, 253, 254. 
In National Association of Social Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 
625-29 (1st Cir. 1995), the court raised six factors justifying adjudication of 
issues even though not preserved below: 1) whether the new argument 
raises a pure issue of law that could be decided without further fact-
finding; 2) whether the argument raises an issue of constitutional 
magnitude; 3) whether the argument is 'highly persuasive' and the failure 
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to consider it would threaten a miscarriage of justice; 4) whether 
considering the argument would work any special prejudice or inequity to 
the other party; 5) whether the party's failure to raise the argument below 
seemed inadvertent or was done deliberately to yield a tactical advantage; 
and 6) whether the argument impUcates matters of 'great public moment,1 
such as federalism, comity and respect for the independent democratic 
institutions. 
In this case, the defendant and his counsel were shocked to find a 
90-day confinement under death-row conditions interspersed with 
coercive brainwashing group techniques to dehumanize prisoners into 
compliant confessors of gross iniquities. The cardinal sin in all such 
settings is failure to cooperate. The State Prison appears to be without 
oversight or examination. Defendant wants a full investigation of its 
protocols and techniques for so-called sex offenders. 
Defendant wanted an independent evaluation by someone of his 
choice so as to rebut Dr. Fox's evaluation. There was no justification, other 
than the Court's pique, to send Defendant to prison for another state 
"evaluation", regarding which, if he did not cooperate, he would be 
sentenced to five years in prison. To plead guilty to Ught charges and then 
be punished for heavy dismissed charges was grossly unfair and 
impermissibly excessive. 
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In addition, the year the defendant served in prison was 
disproportionate to anything he had done, and was thus unconstitutional. 
The 8th Amendment apphes not only to cruel and unusual punishment, but 
also to excessive punishment. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. (2008) 
held that a state could not punish by death the crime of raping a child, 
"...capital punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of proportion to 
the crime or it does not fulfill the two distinct social purposes served by the 
death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes." 
The Court below met Defendant's challenges with retributive and excessive 
punishment. 
THE PROSECUTION'S NOT PRODUCING EXPRESSLY 
REQUESTED VIDEO RECORDINGS OF THE STATE'S TWO 
INTERVIEWS WITH THE ALLEGED VICTIM WAS 
PREJUDICIAL TO MR. WHITE'S DEFENSE 
Not producing evidence that the defendant had requested in writing 
suggests that the State was deliberately withholding the evidence to its 
advantage, or it would have produced the evidence as required by law. 
Rule 16 (a)(4) requires the production of "evidence known to the 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt 
of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced 
punishment". 
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The withheld video interview tapes showed that the victim instigated 
any contact between them and was adamant about not revealing 
Defendant's identity. She did so only after being severely pressured by 
Detective Turner. Such evidence tended to mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant. 
Medel, cited by the State, does not control this issue as that case 
dealt with post-conviction relief after a guilty plea to multiple felonies. The 
question facing Mr. White, was whether he should plead guilty to a 
pornography charge, as was before the court in Tillman u. State 128 P.3d 
1123 (2006) where the State had failed to disclose a transcript suggesting 
that its crucial trial witness had been coached into giving more believable 
testimony and that even the investigating officer initially did not believe 
her. We reasoned that"[w]hile the suppressed transcripts do not contain 
any earth shattering revelations, they do contain significant evidence that 
damages the credibility of the prosecution's star witness and undermines 
critical aspects of the prosecution's theory as to why the death penalty was 
justified."(fni9). 
In White, it was much clearer from the video recording that the 
victim had complete contempt for the State's interference with her private 
life, and she wanted nothing to do with its investigators. The police reports 
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did not come close to reflecting the "victim's" hostility to the State and her 
taking full responsibility for the defendant's involvement. 
Rule i6)(a)(4) is both procedurally and substantively unfair, for it 
gives the prosecution untrammeled discretion to decided whether or not 
the evidence it alone conceals is mitigating to the defendant's guilt. That is 
not for the prosecution to decide, but for the defense to evaluate. Brady is 
to the contrary, and requires all doubts about the value of the evidence to 
the defense to be resolved in favor of disclosure, Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78,88 (1935). As presently postured, the law gives the State every 
incentive to withhold evidence and later argue that it was not dispositive 
anyway. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has suffered a year in prison, two months of it in death 
row conditions saturated with incessant brain washing coupled with 
pornographic stimuli recorded by a medieval contraption that can no more 
diagnose sexual predator proclivities than a divining rod can find water. 
For the defendant to be so positioned from pleading guilty to conduct not 
constituting a sex crime, then to be punished for crimes never proved, and 
last of all, harshly sentenced for daring to raise constitutional violations is 
monumental claptrap. Swift action should be taken to root out such 
torture and to curb official hysteria over consensual sex by aggressive 
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mature minor females. CW was right when she charged in the recorded 
interview: "The law is stupid!" 
Dated: January 7, 2009 
/\J £,j£av 
Thomas M. Burton 
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